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Good prospects  
Uncertainty and the responsible governance of Earth as a system  
 
Arthur Petersen, September 29th, 2011 
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This text is an English translation of Professor Arthur C. Petersen’s inaugural address as 
Special Professor of Science and Environmental Public Policy at the VU University 
Amsterdam, held at September 29th, 2011. This chair was created by the PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency and addresses the large, deep uncertainty associated with 
the dynamics of the Earth system and the dynamics of societies. How can societies and 
individual actors deal with uncertainty and complexity? The overarching question is: how, in 
the face of all the many uncertainties, can system Earth be managed in a responsible manner? 
More specifically, how can scientists form good prospects of the future – while telling like it 
is – without being condemned as false prophets? 
 
Arthur Petersen (1970) obtained PhD degrees in atmospheric physics and chemistry (Utrecht 
University, 1999) and in philosophy of science (VU University Amsterdam, 2006). He now 
works as Chief Scientist at the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and as 
Special Professor of Science and Environmental Public Policy at the VU University 
Amsterdam. He is Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics and Political 
Science and Research Affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
After his dissertation in philosophy of science, on uncertainty in computer simulations of 
climate change, Arthur continued researching topics in methodology and modelling. He 
published on methodological aspects of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the 
statistics of climate change in the past and on the value-ladenness of model assumptions. He 
also performed social-scientific research into (methods for) responsibly dealing with 
uncertainty and has published on ‘post-normal science’, stakeholder participation in scientific 
assessments, dealing with value plurality, adaptive policy-making and dealing with uncertain 
technological risks. 
 
Besides his professional jobs, Arthur has been active within Pugwash (or Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs in full), an organisation that brings together, from 
around the world, influential scholars and public figures concerned with reducing the danger 
of armed conflict and seeking cooperative solutions for global problems such as those related 
to poverty alleviation and protection of the environment. 
 
Arthur lives with his wife and two children in Bilthoven. He drives an old Peugeot. 
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Rector Magnificus, ladies and gentlemen,  
 
Prophecies are rarely fulfilled, although this does not deter the prophets and their followers. 
Throughout history, many cults have told us that the end of the world is nigh, and they look 
forward to the ensuing ‘ecstasy’. In their view, the world is a bad place and must be put out of 
its misery. They believe that they will be spared, and in preparation they live their earthly 
lives in accordance with their particular interpretation of the Kingdom of God. Even when 
their latest prediction of the end of the world fails to materialize, they continue to insist that 
they are right and that they are indeed ‘the chosen ones’.1 Prophets who unconditionally 
predict the end of the world are false prophets. A theologian might tell us that a true prophet 
is someone who tries to awaken mankind, to alert us to certain risks. A true prophecy is thus 
not the same as a prediction.2  
 
Can the environmentalist who predict the end of the world due to global warming also be 
regarded as false prophets? They are entirely convinced that they are right, but are they also 
blind to the facts? Since the publication of his book The Skeptical Environmentalist in 2001, 
the Danish sociologist Bjørn Lomborg has attracted considerable international publicity. He 
accuses environmental organizations of being selective in their presentation of scientific data 
in order to support the standpoint – or ‘litany’ as he terms it – that the world is in terminal 
decline.3 One similarity between some environmentalists and the aforementioned cults is that 
they adhere to a very slanted interpretation of the facts: all life on Earth will come to an end 
and it is already far too late to do anything about it. One difference is that their predictions of 
environmental catastrophe have a somewhat more distant horizon, whereupon it will be many 
decades or even centuries before all the facts are known and we can determine whether there 
is any sound basis to those predictions. And then we have the false prophets who claim that 
there is no such thing as climate change caused by human activity. They too predict the end of 
the world as we know it, but one brought about by draconian environmental legislation. A 
question which has occupied me for many years is how science can help policy to steer a 
course between these two extremes – the alarmist position and that of the denialists.  
 
Today, there is indeed great uncertainty about the future of our planet. For one thing, we still 
know too little about how the Earth works as a system. We are dealing with an extremely 
complex natural system, and one which we shall probably never completely understand. This 
applies at all levels of scale, from the local to the global. We are now in the anthropocene, an 
era in which mankind itself has become a significant geological factor, with human activities 
having a major impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The large-scale changes to ‘system Earth’ 
can create new opportunities as well as new risks. Both the opportunities and the risks are 
subject to uncertainties. Indeed, the future is shrouded in uncertainty. Not only do we not 
know how the natural systems work, we do not know nearly enough about how society itself 
works at any level of scale. Furthermore, the measures proposed in response to the risks 
created by system changes will themselves have uncertain effects.  
 
In short, climate change might result in many species becoming extinct, and in the complete 
collapse of human and natural systems. On the other hand, the consequences could be 
relatively minor. (The operative word here is ‘relatively’, since there will still be a dramatic 
local impact in some places, and of course disastrous consequences for the species which are 
lost.) Similarly, the measures and new technologies which are now seen as promising ways to 
mitigate the damage may indeed be real breakthroughs, but they could all come to nothing. 
How should society and the individual actors address the many uncertainties? What 
approaches are available to them? Within the limited time at my disposal today, I shall try to 
explain how such questions can be made the subject of formal research.  
 
My research revolves around a broad interpretation of ‘uncertainty’, in which there is also a 
place for ambiguity and the complexity of objectives. It allows for various world views and 
values. But there remains one key, overarching question: how, in the face of all the many 
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uncertainties, can system Earth be managed in a responsible manner? More specifically, how 
can scientists form good prospects of the future – while telling like it is – without being 
condemned as false prophets? I address such questions in the context of ‘the good life’: a 
philosophical concept which can be summarized as a pleasant and responsible existence for 
everyone, retaining everything good that our planet has to offer for the benefit of both today’s 
society and future generations.4 
 
The precautionary culture  
 
In the past, people took a very different approach to uncertainty and risk.5 In early modern 
society, those who suffered harm (in the sense of injury, loss or damage) were not seen as 
‘victims’ to be helped or compensated. They and they alone had to bear the consequences: a 
case of ‘every man for himself’. Any misfortune, such as an accident in the workplace, was 
attributed to fate. The nineteenth century saw a shift from the ‘blame culture’ to a ‘risk 
culture’, in which loss or injury was seen more as an inevitable system effect rather than the 
avoidable consequence of individual actions or omissions. From the viewpoint of costs versus 
benefits, people would simply accept the risks, while collective arrangements – insurance – 
provided compensation for any loss or injury incurred. It was in the 1970s that the 
‘precautionary’ culture began to emerge.  
 
Roel Pieterman, who specializes in the sociology of law, explains the precautionary culture as 
the result of five societal learning processes, together with a radicalization of the risk culture.6 
The first such learning process was the development of the welfare state, which taught 
everyone that an increasing number of different types of ‘harm’ would be compensated, and 
compensated more fully. Second, many of the existing threats to health and wellbeing had 
now been removed. Third, people were encouraged to believe that the prevention of loss or 
damage was not their own direct personal responsibility. Fourth, it was realized that many 
risks and threats go beyond the individual’s direct personal experience or sphere of influence. 
And fifth, there was far greater scepticism with regard to the authority of government. I would 
like to add a sixth process to this list: a shift from an emphasis on solidarity to an emphasis on 
self-interest.  
 
The combination of these factors led to a call for all risks to be eradicated. Alongside the risks 
created by climate change further to human activity, Pieterman discusses – at the same level – 
the risks of low-frequency radiation from mobile telephone networks, the risks of drilling for 
gas under the Wadden Sea, and the risks of vaccinating children. Mobile network operators 
wishing to erect new antennas still face significant public opposition, even though experts 
state that the risks are negligible or non-existent. Permits to extract gas from under the 
Wadden Sea have been withheld on numerous occasions. There is a significant body of 
research to confirm that the risks (predominantly the risk of subsidence) are minimal. 
Nevertheless, permit procedures were delayed due to the uncertainty that remained. And 
while there is worldwide consensus that the health gains of vaccination far outweigh the risks, 
there are still parents who refuse to have their children vaccinated, citing hypothetical damage 
to the immune system, the development of ultra-resistant virus strains or the extremely small 
risk – less than one in a million – of a fatal reaction.  
 
A precautionary climate policy? 
 
In my view, it is not appropriate to place the risks of climate change due to human activity on 
the same level as these technological risks. The cited examples are all small risks, although 
exactly how small is itself uncertain. There is evidence to suggest that the global climate has 
changed significantly over the past century. It is ‘very likely’, by which I mean that there is a 
greater than 90% probability, that the average global surface temperature rose by between 
0.6° and 0.9°C during this period.7 If we look at even longer timescales, we see evidence of 
significant warming. The past fifty years have ‘likely’ (greater than 66% probability) been the 
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warmest period in the northern hemisphere for the past 1,300 years.8 The past one hundred 
years have seen a significant increase in rainfall in the eastern parts of North and South 
America, northern Europe and North and Central Asia. There have been equally significant 
droughts in the Sahel region, the Mediterranean region, southern Africa and parts of South 
Asia.9 In most land regions, periods of heavy rainfall have become more frequent.10 Let us 
remember that the variability of weather conditions is also part of the concept of ‘climate’. 
 
Of course, such statements about observed climate changes say nothing about the causes of 
those changes. Nevertheless, the vast majority of climate scientists believe that there is a link 
with the ‘greenhouse effect’ which is enhanced by human activity. The link has even been 
quantified. It is ‘very likely’ that at least half of the warming seen during the past fifty years is 
attributable to man’s emissions of greenhouse gases.11  
 
Given all the changes observed, and given the fact that at least some can be attributed to the 
greenhouse effect of human activity, it is not unreasonable to assume that even greater 
changes are in store. Some of the future changes to our climate system are already inevitable, 
having been caused by past emissions. Even if global emissions of greenhouse gases are 
vastly reduced in the very near future, these changes will still occur. Take, for example, the 
rising sea levels. During the course of the twentieth century, the average sea level worldwide 
rose by between 12 and 22 cm. It is very likely that this was due in part to expansion caused 
by higher water temperatures.12 Moreover, it seems probable that sea levels will continue to 
rise for hundreds, perhaps even thousands of years, whereupon the overall increase will be in 
the order of several metres. It will, after all, take hundreds or thousands of years before the 
temperature of all oceans rises by an equal amount.  
 
But even in the somewhat shorter term – within the next one hundred years, we are likely to 
see some dramatic and unavoidable effects of climate change. It is perfectly conceivable that 
the small island states (such as the Maldives) will face ever more frequent and ever more 
destructive flooding. The same applies to the low-lying coastal zones of the continental land 
masses – regions in which hundreds of millions of people now live. Bangladesh is one 
example. There might also be changes in the patterns of precipitation, while the higher 
temperatures will place considerable strain on various ecosystems. Some of those ecosystems 
may not survive, whereupon many species of flora and fauna face extinction. We are already 
in a desperate situation. No matter what we do, we are powerless to halt some climate 
changes, and hence unable to preclude the problems they will cause. In the interests of 
balance, I should also mention that some countries – such as Russia – will actually benefit 
from climate change, provided it is not too extreme, in that their agricultural output will 
increase. So, the effects are not all negative.13 
 
We should not attach too much value to the precise outcomes of modelling forecasts, 
however. The fundamental debate about climate change must focus on the seemingly 
improbable events which will nevertheless have major consequences should they occur. It is 
still too early to say whether the ‘precautionary culture’ has provided an effective response to 
the climate problem. In terms of climate policy, the precautionary principle14 offers very little 
assistance in making appropriate decisions. Just how cautious must we be? Must we strive to 
restrict global warming to 2°C? Could we permit ourselves a little more leeway, or is 1.5°C 
already too much? How much must national governments and other actors invest in the 
necessary measures? The precautionary principle does not provide the answers to such 
questions. In fact, in the context of the climate treaties, the precautionary principle merely 
allows countries to implement a policy while there is still remaining uncertainty. It can do no 
more. To put it another way, the precautionary principle encourages us to insure against the 
possible collapse of system Earth, but does not allow us to calculate the maximum 






What role could cost-benefit analysis play in evaluating measures designed to optimize 
opportunities and restrict the risks to man and nature in the face of a possible collapse of 
system Earth? Let us first consider how Lomborg suggests we should proceed. He proposes 
establishing different spending priorities for the resources we now devote to international 
development. Lomborg assembled a group of eight leading economists (including three Nobel 
laureates) in Copenhagen to prioritize proposals for ways in which to tackle various world 
problems, ranging from the HIV/Aids pandemic to the Kyoto Protocol and taxes on carbon 
emissions. The experts were asked to assume that governments had a ‘spare’ fifty billion 
dollars at their disposal. In this group’s ranking of the ten most pressing global problems, 
climate change finished in tenth place.15 For the past few years, Lomborg has been the 
director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, part of the Copenhagen Business School, 
where he has repeated this process.  
 
The critical question which we can ask Lomborg and his colleagues is whether the standard 
cost-benefit analysis is really able to establish such a ranking. Can it do so in a manner which 
is politically acceptable and which adequately addresses the very long timescales of system 
Earth, as well as the requirement for continuity or ‘sustainability’? Where sustainability 
relates to the allocation of relatively scarce natural resources, there is of course an economic 
aspect at play. In any analysis of the sustainability issues, it is therefore useful to draw upon 
formal welfare theory.16 That theory is concerned with subjective economic goals which are 
defined more broadly than the objective economic goals (wealth in terms of the possession of 
economic assets) or financial economic goals (wealth in terms of money). Given that the 
pursuit of one goal will often stand in the way of achieving the other, concessions and 
compromises must be made at both the individual and societal level.17 To use the formal term, 
there will be ‘trade-offs’. 
 
Many uncertainties attach to the use of cost-benefit analyses at the level of system Earth.18 
Applying the standard economic discount rate does not allow us to compare the future effects 
on welfare with the immediate effects. And when evaluating measures, should we be 
concerned solely with the overall returns or should we also take the fair distribution of the 
welfare effects into account? What factors should determine the discount rate itself? What 
valuation methods should be used? Can the chosen method address the negative valuation of 
possible catastrophes? Given uncertainties such as these, the question is whether the amount 
that represents the effects of the measure on the ‘balance sheet’ is merely the result of an 
arbitrary calculation. If so, it is meaningless. It is certainly useful to assess policy proposals in 
terms of their likely effectiveness, and to take account of the priorities which global society 
wishes to pursue. However, this ‘means discussion’ must not obscure the ‘goals discussion’. 
If the climate risks identified today are considered unacceptable, mankind must take action 
but must do so in a way which does not create unacceptable consequences in terms of other 
world problems. Now that there is a collective objective – to limit global warming to within 
two degrees and to do so with a reasonably certain degree of probability – it is indeed useful 
to apply a cost-benefit analysis to the various proposed solutions and to apply economic 
policy instruments. But we should remain alert to the perversities which may emerge, as in 
carbon emissions trading systems which could result in additional loss of biodiversity.  
 
Nuclear energy and geo-engineering? 
 
The discussion about the economic efficiency of ‘solutions’ to one of the greatest threats to 
system Earth – the climate problem – is closely linked to the discussion about technology. 
What new technologies will actually materialize and which will work? Opinions are divided. 
There are those who propose a technological ‘quick fix’, and others who regard this option as 
highly undesirable. Among the latter group there are those who do not wish to use technology 
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at all, and those who are willing to experiment, but to do so cautiously taking the uncertainty 
factor fully into account.  
 
There are many different forms of technology which could be applied. Many environmental 
scientists consider it a matter of course that we must eventually derive practically all our 
energy from renewable sources such as solar and wind power. Exactly how these energy 
technologies will have developed by 2050 and beyond is unknown: this is yet another 
uncertainty. We can make plans and projections based on the technologies we already have, 
but we must also take into account the possibility of new technologies being developed in the 
meantime. Given the scale and seriousness of the problem, however, the world cannot afford 
the luxury of dismissing any energy technology out of hand. All options – including nuclear 
energy and even ‘geo-engineering’– must be given due consideration. Of course, both nuclear 
energy and geo-engineering are subject to a number of caveats and misgivings which will do 
much to inform the societal debate in the years to come. My decision to devote attention to 
nuclear energy and geo-engineering today could, I suppose, be interpreted as a call to consider 
these options in preference to solar and wind energy. That is a risk I shall have to take, but it 
is really not my intention. In fact, I think we may be expecting rather too much of nuclear 
energy and geo-engineering. 
 
Nuclear energy does indeed serve to reduce carbon emissions and, according to many experts, 
is economically attractive even when all the social costs and other negative aspects are taken 
into consideration. Nevertheless, investment in nuclear energy is currently at a very low level, 
with many projects having been abandoned or put on hold following the Fukushima disaster. 
Current uranium stocks will certainly last the rest of the 21st century without the nuclear 
industry having to resort to enrichment or recycling. But even with a major upscaling of 
current nuclear energy facilities, this option would eventually be able to provide only some 
ten per cent of the global energy requirement. Nuclear energy can therefore never be regarded 
as the sole answer to climate change. Moreover, some major disadvantages attach to the use 
of nuclear energy and to any upscaling. Apart from the problem of disposing of nuclear waste 
safely, which has still not been solved, the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a major 
concern. It seems that our world is unable to observe the doctrine of the non-proliferation 
treaties. There are several countries which have used the development of nuclear energy as a 
stepping stone to that of nuclear weapons. And if Fukushima has taught us anything, it is that 
there are always aspects that not even the most diligent safety planner could have foreseen. 
Being well prepared means remaining open to surprises – a point to which I shall return in a 
few moments.19 
 
Geo-engineering comes in many shapes and sizes. One proposal is to launch gigantic mirrors 
into space to deflect the sun’s rays. This is not a particularly practical idea. Other suggestions 
include injecting a fine mist of sulphate particles into the stratosphere, or ‘seeding’ seawater 
to promote evaporation and the formation of cloud cover – both somewhat more realistic. 
Even planting new forests can be seen as a form of geo-engineering, the intention being that 
the trees will absorb carbon from the atmosphere. The geo-engineering methods which deflect 
sunlight are being touted as a form of ‘emergency cooling’ for our planet. People used to be 
concerned that too much attention was being devoted to reducing greenhouse emissions and 
to climate adaptation. Today, they are concerned that the technological geo-engineering 
options will merely ‘camouflage’ the effects of the greenhouse gases. Once again, the 
problem would not be tackled at its source. Many options, such as injecting sulphate particles 
into the stratosphere, are not permanent solutions. Once you stop injecting the particles, the 
underlying problem – the increased CO2 concentration – is actually worse than it was and the 
warming effect will continue even more rapidly. This sort of geo-engineering – also known as 
‘solar radiation management’ is at best a stopgap option to offset the worst effects of rising 
temperatures, while extremely stringent emission reduction measures will have to be 
implemented as a structural solution for the long term. Another objection to most geo-




In all discussions about solutions to the climate problem, whether in the economic sphere 
(carbon pricing and trading) or the technological, it is essential to remain realistic about which 
measures should be implemented at which level. Moreover, it must be asked whether the 
global community is actually capable of making agreements which will limit the temperature 
increase to below two degrees, given the enormous economic interests which attach to CO2 
emissions and their reduction. The international negotiations thus far give little cause for 
optimism. According to David Victor, professor of International Relations at UC San Diego, 
the architecture of the UN negotiation process is not fit for purpose. There are too many 
countries at the table and too many topics on the agenda.21 He suggests that there should be a 
‘carbon club’ in the mould of the earlier world trade negotiations, with only those countries 
which really matter in terms of carbon emissions taking part. Rather than making agreements 
on reduction targets and timeframes – which are actually rather meaningless because it is 
extremely difficult for governments in countries with an open economy to manage or control 
emissions at all – they should make agreements regarding the actions to be taken by national 
governments.22 Victor also proposes that membership of this ‘pioneer group’ should bring 
certain specific benefits so that other countries will wish to join, and will become eligible to 
do so only if they endorse ‘climate accession agreements’. In this scenario, the UN will come 
to the fore only at a much later stage, embracing the (by now) extensive group of countries 
which have already linked their respective emissions trading systems, and promoting the 
development of a truly global regime. That regime is then the culmination of the process, not 
the starting point of the negotiations. Whether Victor’s proposal is viable remains to be seen. 
It seems unlikely that Europe would find it acceptable. Nevertheless, it does seem appropriate 
to treat the climate problem not as the exclusive domain of the United Nations, but to leave 
the door open for other forums which can play a useful part in tackling it. In any event, Victor 
makes specific reference to the economic aspect of climate policy, which does of course play 
a dominant role.  
 
Although the current formula for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is familiar to all 
concerned – a stable and adequately high carbon price together with policy to promote energy 
efficiency and the development of new energy technologies with low carbon emissions – the 
actual implementation of this formula is far from easy. Governments are unable to predict or 
manage societal developments, and neither can they predict or manage technological 
developments. The difficulties need come as no surprise. Even during the 1990s, the social 
scientists drew attention to the likely problems, as in the assessment Human Choice and 
Climate Change,23 co-authored by Steve Rayner, now a professor at Oxford University 
following an extensive career in the United States. This assessment presents valuable insights 
into framing, institutional processes, the speed of social change, the limitations of rational 
planning, interdisciplinarity, the focus on practice, ‘mainstreaming’, implementation at the 
regional and local scale, resilience and the pluralistic approach to decision-making.  
 
The very same aspects have once again come to the fore in recent years. A good example is 
the interdisciplinary project De Matrix which, under the leadership of Dirk Sijmons, has set 
out to identify cohesive action opportunities for climate and spatial policy in the 
Netherlands.24 The project calls for a climate mitigation policy to be implemented at the 
international level, with a direct ‘trickle-down’ effect for companies and the general public in 
all countries, whereby national governments play no more – and no less – than a facilitating 
role. In the wake of the Copenhagen Climate Conference fiasco, Albert Cath, who represents 
the social sciences within the project, published an interesting article in the national 
newspaper De Volkskrant, the title of which can be translated as ‘The ball is in the citizen’s 
court after Copenhagen’.25 In the economic sphere, Sander de Bruyn has proposed a new form 
of CO2 levy on all products, operating in a similar way to value added tax. This ‘Gross Added 
Carbon Tax’ would bring the costs of climate policy directly to the level of the individual 
consumer.26 Eric Ferguson and I have called for a levy on every oil and gas well, and on 
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every coal mine.27 Both latter proposals serve to plug the various loopholes which allow
unscrupulous to circumvent the current emissions trading system. Both, I would contend, 
deserve further research, to include a careful examination of the institutional aspects. In the 
field of spatial policy, Bram van de Klundert states that the attainment of the emission 
reduction targets, and/or the removal of carbon from the atmosphere, represents a challenge of 
potentially mammoth proportions. He therefore suggests that it is extremely important to 
research whether it will be possible to achieve a cultural shift in the Netherlands, replacing the 
NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) attitude with one of ‘Please in My Back Yard’ (PIMBY).
 the 
28 
How can the advantages of sustainable energy sources be passed on to the (local) producers of 
sustainable energy? Once again, the national government’s role should be that of facilitator, 
whereby the main effect will be achieved in the context of a strong international policy.  
 
In a similar vein, Maarten Hajer, director of the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency, has recently proposed a radical change in the government’s management 
philosophy.29 At present, he contends, the government makes too little use of the creativity 
and learning ability of the business community and the general public. While there remains a 
clear role for the government in promoting a broad portfolio of technological development,30 
it is now time to involve the ‘soft’ institutional side as well. By removing obstacles and 
barriers, the government will encourage society at large to play its part in developing new 
markets for the new technologies.  
 
In short, institutional questions play a very prominent role in any response to the climate 
problem, which is one of the most significant issues affecting the continuity and sustainability 
of the Earth system. I am extremely proud that VU University, and specifically Frank 
Biermann, have taken such a leading role in the worldwide Earth System Governance project, 
which highlights the crucial importance of institutional changes to the global decision-making 
system. I am also extremely proud that the project has asked me to co-chair its ‘Taskforce on 
Methodology for Earth System Governance Research’. One thing is already very clear to me: 
the current international approach to Earth system governance is unsatisfactory. We need new 
institutions and a radical shift in how to deal with knowledge and values. This is what I shall 
be working to achieve in the years to come.  
  
Uncertainty, complexity and guiding principles  
 
What makes the responsible governance of the Earth as a system so very difficult? I would 
like to offer a very brief account of the complexity and uncertainty which characterize the 
problems involved. Nature and mankind – the world itself – are extremely ambiguous. 
Looking for the essence of nature, of man or of the world is a fruitless task.31 We term a 
situation or idea ‘ambiguous’ if it can be viewed from two or more frames of reference, each 
of which is consistent in itself but incompatible with the others. In the traditional scientific 
approach, the participative mode must be suppressed, and we must act as if everything is 
external, objective and immutable. One of the most basic aspects of the state of humanity – of 
being a person – is that our conscious selves can work in one of two different modes at any 
one time: that of actor or that of observer. The alternative, propounded as a new scientific 
approach by the mathematician William Byers among others, is to allow yourself to be aware 
of the ambiguity of situations, and to translate that ambiguity into creativity.  
 
Examples of ambiguity within mathematics include the polarities of quality and quantity in 
whole numbers, and the complex world of real numbers, which can be treated as both discrete 
and continuous.32 The French philosopher, sociologist and ‘complexity thinker’ Edgar Morin 
developed a system theory based on evolutionary biology. Here too, there is an irreconcilable 
ambiguity between subject and object.33 Human behaviour can often be modelled – to a 
certain extent – based on the options available within the existing structures, but there always 
remains a grey area in the form of unpredictability and surprises. We thus see reflexivity, 
whereby the relationship between the options and structures is not stable. In his book 
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Ignorance and Surprise, the German environmental sociologist Matthias Gross offers an 
overview of sociological theories which have given rise to social experiments and surprises.34 
Gross concludes that much of the current sociological theory relating to our knowledge 
society is based on deep uncertainty and the inevitability of surprises. He cites the 
regeneration of the open-pit brown coal mines south of Leipzig to become an attractive 
lakeland area as an example of a social experiment. Very little was known about how to go 
about transforming these deep pits, from which all water had been assiduously pumped out in 
the past, into lakes of ecological value. However, because all actors were determined to bring 
about the transformation, they were prepared to allow for surprises and to adapt their plans 
and methods accordingly without too many institutional problems. They were able to learn 
‘on the fly’.  
 
In such an unpredictable, complex world, how can we hope to achieve the ‘good prospects’ of 
my title? Let me first call upon one of the greatest thinkers of our age, Amartya Sen. At the 
beginning of his book The Idea of Justice, Sen proposes a theory of justice which can and, he 
contends, must be applied in practice, It is one which offers the opportunity to determine how 
injustice can be reduced in order to promote justice.35 He therefore opts not to present the 
largely irrelevant characteristics of the perfect and perfectly just society, upon which so much 
political philosophy is based. To arrive at a responsible governance system for the Earth itself, 
we must arrive at a theory which defines justice in the sense of a ‘good life in partnership with 
the Earth’. That theory must establish the factors which will promote such a just relationship 
and those which would undermine it, without presenting any idealistic, Utopian picture. In 
short, it must be a pragmatic theory. Such a theory will not seek optimization, but will 
identify the worst case scenarios and strive to mitigate their effects should they indeed 
emerge.  
 
Next, I turn to the aforementioned Edgar Morin, who in the 1990s applied his thinking on 
complexity to the global environment problem and its implications in terms of the 
responsibilities of mankind in the anthropocene era.36 Morin concluded that man’s task is to 
continue the process of civilizing the Earth. Amid the hopelessness of late-modern society, 
which incorporates both problem and solution, we must encourage the evolution of modernity 
through a process of experimentation. Morin formulated six basic principles for this task, here 
shortened to aphorisms:  
 
1. Life builds up hope that builds up life.  
2. All the great transformations or creations have been unthinkable until they actually 
came to pass. 
3. All the happy events of history have always been a priori improbable.  
4. First, dig underground and transform the substratum before anything is changed on 
the surface. 
5. Where danger threatens, that which saves from it also grows. 
6. We can become even more human.  
 
There is no guaranteed ‘happy ending’ here, but at least there are reasonably good prospects. 
After all, we are only just at the very beginning of the anthropocene. But even in the worst 
case scenario, I believe that the observance of the following guiding principles, inspired by 
Morin’s aphorisms, will enable us to make use of new technology in our governance of the 
Earth system:  
 
1. Do not be a false prophet, but continue to hope that man and nature will continue to 
live on Earth. Working to develop new technology will offer hope.  
2. Allow for the possibility of new technological breakthroughs and behaviour which 
could not have been foreseen.  
3. Do not stake everything on technological developments which experts consider 
feasible at a given moment. They may not materialize.  
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4. Allow new technology to prove itself gradually by means of small-scale local 
experiments. If and when critical mass is achieved, the technology can then be 
incorporated into the system as a whole.  
5. Be alert to the risks of new technology: its use can both exacerbate and mitigate 
problems.  
6. Learn from one’s mistakes in order to be able to use new technology more 
effectively.  
 
These are, of course, just examples of the possible guiding principles. In the years ahead, I 
shall attempt to formulate yet more based on empirical research. I shall study social 
experiments in which one learns how to cope more effectively with uncertainty, ambiguity 
and complexity. I shall also examine various value systems, the effect of institutional 
conditions, and the way in which scientists and policy-makers regard their own roles. In all 
this, my frame of reference will be that of philosophical pragmatism. My heuristics will be the 
experiment: what constitutes a good social experiment? My metaphor will be Morin’s analogy 
of digging down into the substrata. My compass will be the ethics of ‘the good life’. In all my 
research, I shall apply a practical ‘down to earth’ approach in examining the various aspects 
of the development of new technologies: safer nuclear generators, geo-engineering and 
renewable energy, to cite just three examples. Once again, I wish to stress that effective 
solutions to the problems which jeopardize the future of the Earth system will rely on the 
existing methods, such as carbon pricing, just as much as on any new technology. New 
approaches must not represent a technology push: there must be a technology pull. 
 
The role of scientists 
 
Given all the uncertainties which surround the future of the Earth system, what role can and 
should scientists play in the societal debate about its governance? The perceptions of risks 
such as climate change are ambiguous and vary between countries, cultures and communities. 
Even scientists hold varying perceptions of the risks, although they do not always make those 
perceptions explicit. When a scientist is called upon to advise the government or to take part 
in the public debate, he bears a great responsibility to perform the task well. To explain this 
point further, it is useful to consider the various roles which scientists can play in relation to 
the decision-makers.  
 
In his book The Honest Broker (2007), Roger Pielke identifies four possible roles. The first is 
that of ‘pure scientist’. In this role, the scientist is not interested in the practical implications 
of his or her research, but is merely searching for ‘the truth’. The second role is that of 
‘science arbiter’, in which the scientist will confine himself to advising on those issues which 
can be incontrovertibly resolved by science: there are right answers and wrong answers. The 
third role is that of ‘issue advocate’. Here, the scientist attempts to promote a particular 
interest by virtue of his status as an expert, while not revealing his own values or preferences. 
Finally, there is the ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’. This role comes to the fore when 
the problems under consideration are too complex and too politically polarized to permit any 
straightforward, hard-and-fast scientific advice to be given.  
 
In today’s climate debate, we can see scientists playing each of these four roles. Given the 
complexity and conflicting interests inherent in climate policy, it is the ‘honest broker’ who 
can claim to address the facts most effectively, doing so with due regard for the values 
involved. But is it possible to fulfil this role with complete effectiveness? In the media, we 
regularly encounter issue advocates at the two extremes – those for climate measures and 
those against – who base arguments on their own slanted interpretation of the uncertainties. 
One is absolutely convinced that doom and disaster await, the other is equally convinced that 
there is nothing to worry about. Each takes a very different approach to the underlying 
scientific knowledge. Within their own groups, there is after all a significant degree of 
selectivity when it comes to the facts which matter. It is not possible to offer any 
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straightforward recipe whereby we can resolve the deadlock. It is certainly inappropriate to 
return to a hard division between facts and values.  
 
In 2009 and 2010, the sceptics used the media to engineer ‘Climategate’. Based on emails and 
other documents obtained by hacking the computers of the University of East Anglia’s 
Climate Research Unit, they claimed that the data on global temperatures hundreds or 
thousands of years ago had been falsified. The advocates of climate policy refuted the 
allegations. Ultimately, this discussion is about the functioning of the scientific community, 
and especially the role of peer review, when a research programme involves such significant 
societal interests. Once it is realized, as Latour and Woolgar reminded us over thirty years 
ago, that all science is conducted by people, who may be expected to have the typical human 
failings, and that many ‘facts’ are actually historical constructs, the accusations of ‘foul play’ 
will quickly follow.37 And yet, there are epistemic and non-epistemic values at play in all 
scientific practices. Together, those values create a subjective component, or ‘value-
ladenness’, in the data, models, theories, apparatus, routines, disciplines, etc. By adopting a 
perspective from which all scientific results are regarded as historical constructs, it is possible 
to expose the value-ladenness of scientific communities. A meta-analysis of ‘Climategate’ 
from such a perspective provides a deeper understanding of how scientists collectively 
prepare themselves to participate in a thorny controversy. Those scientists can be seen to 
devote considerable attention to methodology, by the way.38 
 
I would like to propose a fifth role for scientists. It can be seen as an extension of the role of 
‘honest broker of policy alternatives’ but has a somewhat broader scope. This role entails 
revealing and explaining precisely what the scientific field is doing. It entails providing 
transparency with regard to the questions raised, and it entails reflection on the science system 
itself. I therefore term this role the ‘reflector’ The reflector will reflect upon how research 
themes are defined; he will reveal and explain the underlying value patterns. The reflector 
attempts to stand above the process of interaction between the physical world and policy. He 
is not concerned with the possible answers to policy questions. Rather, he is interested in 
whether the right questions have been asked, and what must be done if there are several, 
potentially conflicting, interests at stake. In a complex society, how can one do justice to the 
interests of the people of today, while also taking seriously the scientific ‘worst case analyses’ 
which relate to the effects on future generations?  
 
Lastly, I wish to call for greater interaction between those people who hold very different 
visions, whether of climate change or of science itself. The concept and tools of ‘post-normal 
science’ – an interactive method of providing decision-makers with scientific information 
which has been reviewed by a more extended community of peers – would seem to offer very 
promising opportunities in this regard.39  
 
To arrive at a complete list of ten guiding principles, I will add four more, which I base on my 
earlier research: 
 
7. Take ‘normal science’ seriously, but also organize reflection on its uncertainties and 
value-ladenness. 
8. Alongside the statistical reliability of results (expressed in terms of probability), 
devote due attention to their methodological reliability (expressed in terms of 
strengths and weaknesses) and their public reliability (expressed as the degree of 
public confidence in the scientists who produce them).  
9. Involve a larger group of specialists and non-specialists who hold different values in 
monitoring the quality of scientific assessments.  
10. Be wary of accepting the conclusions of actors and practitioners at face value: try to 
delve deeper through the layers of complexity by means of narrative methods.  
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In the years ahead, I also expect to conduct further research in this methodological area, 




Before I conclude, I would like to take this opportunity of acknowledging my gratitude to 
various people who have played a key role in my work and career to date.  
 
First, allow me to thank the Rector Magnificus, the members of the university’s Executive 
Board and the Dean of the Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences for the confidence you have 
shown in confirming my appointment to the chair of Science and Environmental Public 
Policy. I also wish to thank the directors of the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency – Maarten Hajer and Reinier van den Berg – and their predecessors Klaas van 
Egmond and Fred Langeweg, for having endowed the chair and for my nomination as its 
incumbent. It is a privilege for me to work one day a week at VU University, alongside my 
work as Chief Scientist at the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and as the 
Deputy Head of its Department of Information, Data and Methodology. I certainly have a 
marvellous job, not least thanks to my sterling colleagues. It gives me great satisfaction to 
work alongside them on assessments which are not only of high scientific quality but of great 
relevance to policy.  
 
I already feel ‘at home’ here at VU University. Together with Eleftheria Vasileiadou, I lead 
the ‘Science and Values for Environmental Governance’ research group, part of the 
department of Environmental Policy Analysis led by Frank Biermann. The research group and 
department form part of the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) and the Amsterdam 
Global Change Institute (AGCI), both of which are led by Frans Berkhout. I have been 
working with the IVM for several years – and with much pleasure – on two projects: 
‘Modelling Governance and Institutions for Global Sustainability Politics’ (ModelGIGS) and 
‘Bridging the Gap between Stakeholders and Climate Modellers’. The latter is a joint project 
involving the PBL, VU University and the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute 
(KNMI). I am very much looking forward to further cooperation with colleagues from both 
VU University and the University of Amsterdam within the new Amsterdam Global Change 
Institute, and no doubt with colleagues from other universities and institutes. I derive great 
fulfilment from working alongside PhD students, postdoctoral researchers and senior 
researchers at VU University, the University of Amsterdam, MIT, the London School of 
Economics, Utrecht University, Wageningen University, the Open University, the PBL, the 
KNMI and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM). Together 
we perform truly groundbreaking research and we have some very ambitious plans; I hope we 
are given the opportunity to bring those plans to fruition! 
 
It would be impossible for me to thank everyone who is involved in these projects, but I do 
wish to mention Frans Berkhout, Frank Biermann, Ken Oye, Larry McCray, Lenny Smith, 
Eleftheria Vasileiadou, Erik Min, Wilco Hazeleger, Dave Huitema, Philipp Pattberg, Marcel 
Kok, Joyeeta Gupta, Matthijs Hisschemöller, Joske Bunders, Jan Boersema, Joop de Boer, 
Annick de Witt, Hanna Schösler, Stefania Munaretto, Gabriella Doci, Ayşem Mert, Eva 
Kunseler, Willemijn Tuinstra, Pita Spruijt, Anne Knol, Erik Lebret, Arjen Zegwaard, Flip 
Wester, Daniel Hogendoorn, David Laws, Anne Loeber, Maarten Hajer, Albert Faber, Albert 
Cath and Mieke van Hemert. No doubt this list will become longer as time goes on.  
 
This is also an appropriate moment to thank those who have contributed to my personal 
development as a scientist. That process began during my MSc project in Theoretical Physics, 
which was supervised by my VU University colleague Piet Mulders. He oversaw my research 
into the scattering of neutrinos off carbon nuclei, and it was due to his invitation to join the 
NIKHEF group in the early 1990s that I gained my first experience in working as part of a 
tight-knit research team. During the same period, Hans Radder and Peter Kirschenmann, also 
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of VU University, inspired me to take up research into philosophy of science. They also 
supervised my second dissertation, which I successfully defended some ten years later.  
 
During my first doctoral research project, it was Han van Dop, Bert Holtslag, Jos Lelieveld 
and other colleagues at the Institute for Marine and Atmospheric research Utrecht (IMAU) 
and the KNMI who taught me how to perform research into atmospheric science. I look back 
with great pleasure on the eighteen months I spent sharing an office with Pier Siebesma and 
Harm Jonker at the KNMI. Inspired by ideas suggested by Peter Duynkerke of IMAU, I 
undertook my first serious research in boundary layer meteorology. The resulting article, 
published in the Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences in 1999, remains my most-cited work. It 
has even been used in research examining solar convection. I thank all my colleagues at the 
IMAU and the KNMI for their help and support.  
 
Between 1999 and 2001, I enjoyed a period of reflection as a postdoc/PhD researcher at the 
Faculty of Philosophy at VU University. I wish to thank the faculty, and in particular Hans 
Radder, for giving me the opportunity to study the reliability of the very computer simulations 
which I had been using for the previous four years. Alongside the philosophical insights I 
gained from Hans Radder and Peter Kirschenmann, I was able to broaden my horizon yet 
further by becoming involved in the national graduate school Science, Technology and 
Modern Culture (WTMC). In my current position, I hope that I will be able to make some 
contribution to the further development of Science and Technology Studies. 
 
In the spring of 2001, I saw my dream job advertised in the newspaper. The environmental 
assessment division of the RIVM was looking for a senior researcher to examine the societal 
aspects of uncertainty. I applied and was accepted. I remain extremely grateful to Anton van 
der Giessen, Peter Janssen and Fred Langeweg for having given me the opportunity to work 
on methods to address ‘uncertainties’, including social-scientific methods. In 2003 I was 
appointed project and programme manager. For the past 10 years I have been concerned with 
finding ways to ensure and enhance the quality of the assessment agency’s products. 
Following the merger with the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research in 2008, I have been 
doing so under the auspices of the PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency. I 
would like to thank my fellow methodologists there, Arthur Beusen, Anton van der Giessen, 
Maria Hage, Peter Janssen, Bram van de Klundert, Johan Melse, Sido Mylius, Willemijn 
Tuinstra, Hans Visser, Martine de Vos, Bert de Vries and Bert de Wit. I also wish to thank 
Marjolein van Asselt of Maastricht University, Arjan Wardekker, Penny Boneschansker-
Klopprogge and Jeroen van der Sluijs of Utrecht University, Annick de Vries, Willem 
Halffman and Rob Hoppe of the University of Twente, and Esther Turnhout and Pieter Leroy 
of Radboud University Nijmegen. I must not forget Leo Meyer, from whom I have learned so 
much about the IPCC. Last year, Leo and I went through the IPCC report in great detail. 
Recently, I succeeded him as PBL representative on the Dutch IPCC delegation.  
 
In recent years, I have become affiliated with a growing number of universities. In 2008, I 
was invited to join the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where I have worked alongside 
Ken Oye and Larry McCray. Since 2009, I have also held a position at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science, where I mainly work alongside Lenny Smith. This year, I 
have become a Special Professor at VU University and have been appointed Chief Scientist at 
the PBL, a role which demands a strong connection with the academic world if it is to be 
filled successfully.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends, without whom my work would simply 
not be worthwhile. Let us continue to celebrate life together!  
 




                                                     
1 A famous book by the social psychologists Festinger, Riecken & Schachter (1956, revised 1964) tells 
of the American UFO cult which predicted a flood which would destroy the entire world. Their timing 
was precise: the event would take place just before dawn on 21 December 1954.  
2 It was my publisher Freek van der Steen (a theologian) who drew my attention to this distinction.  
3 Based on his own presentation of a large body of statistics, Lomborg concludes that there are more 
reasons for optimism than for pessimism. Many ecologists have responded angrily to Lomborg’s 
publication, accusing him of a lack of scientific integrity. An official commission reached much the 
same conclusion but its ruling was quashed by the Danish government due to procedural mistakes. 
Closer examination of Lomborg’s chapter on climate change reveals that he does indeed present the 
main conclusions of the IPCC reports accurately, but also criticizes those findings in a somewhat 
dismissive and optimistic manner. I do not believe that it is just to accuse Lomborg of any impropriety 
based on the content of this chapter, although it is necessary to take his remarks with more than a pinch 
of salt. But this applies equally to some – but not all, or even most – of the statements made by the 
environmental activists.  
4 Cf. van de Klundert (2008), p. 3. 
5 This historical outline is taken from Pieterman (2008). 
6 Cf. Beck (1992). 
7 IPCC (2007), p. 5. 
8 IPCC (2007), p. 9. In making this statement, the IPCC authors have made allowance for the 
methodological problem that some trees, particularly in the northern latitudes and mountainous regions, 
have adapted over the course of the decades and are no longer so sensitive to changes in temperature. 
Accordingly, temperature reconstructions based on the ‘proxy calibration’ method based on tree-ring 
data will not reveal any significant rise in temperature since the mid-20th century, although we can be 
reasonably certain that such a rise has indeed occurred. This discrepancy is termed the ‘divergence 
problem’ and is examined in the scientific literature. In my opinion, the analysis of this methodological 
problem and the possible impact on reconstructions of temperatures several centuries in the past should 
be given greater attention by the scientific community than is currently the case. (See also Visser et al. 
2010).  
9 IPCC (2007), p. 7. 
10 IPCC (2007), p. 8. 
11 IPCC (2007), p. 10. Petersen (2006, 2011) offers a thorough analysis of how the IPCC arrives at such 
assessments. 
12 IPCC (2007), p. 7. 
13 The PBL (2010) has demonstrated that the summaries of the 2007 report are subject to a high degree 
of selectivity with regard to the focus on the main negative effects of climate change. This is due to the 
adoption of a ‘risk-oriented’ approach, an approach which has itself not been adequately defined or 
explained in the report.  
1
(
“When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but 
uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm. 
4 The UNESCO World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 
COMEST) offers the following working definition of the precautionary principle:  
Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment that is: 
− threatening to human life or health, or 
− serious and effectively irreversible, or 
− inequitable to present or future generations, or 
− imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those affected. 
The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis should be ongoing so 
that chosen actions are subject to review. Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be limited to, 
causality or the bounds of the possible harm. Actions are interventions that are undertaken before harm 
occurs that seek to avoid or diminish the harm. Actions should be chosen that are proportional to 
the seriousness of the potential harm, with consideration of their positive and negative consequences, 
and with an assessment of the moral implications of both action and inaction. The choice of action 
should be the result of a participatory process.”  
The Precautionary Principle, p. 13; UNESCO/COMEST (2005), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139578e.pdf, retrieved 9 Sept 2011. 
15 Lomborg (2004). 
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16 As Lionel Robbins, one of the founders of the theory, wrote: “Economics is the science which studies 
human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses” (1935). 
17 Societal preferences which relate to the distribution of wealth can be interpreted as part of the formal 
concept of welfare. Similarly, the wish to ensure continuity of ecological, economic and social qualities 
can be regarded as a primary social requirement (whereby such continuity becomes a component of the 
quality of life). See: den Butter & Dietz (2004) and de Vries & Petersen (2009). 
18 With thanks to Ruth Giesen, a philosophy student at the University of Groningen who completed her 
internship with the PBL in 2007/2008. 
19 van Asselt et al. (2010, pp. 119–133) offers an account of how futurologists can address 
discontinuities and surprises.  
20 Frans Brom (2011) raises an interesting question: why is the initial reaction to the risks of geo-
engineering so often one of caution? Insofar as geo-engineering seeks to restore a situation which has 
been disrupted or disturbed (the global temperature), it is indeed a form of environmental protection 
(which includes an element of precautionary action). However, it will not be effective if implemented 
too cautiously. Brom contends that the notion of precaution is based on ‘an implicit idea of ecological 
values which have not yet been spoilt, or an environment which has not yet been damaged’ (p. 13).  
21 Victor (2011). 
22 E.g. agreements covering such aspects as efficiency, technology and emissions trading systems.  
23 Rayner & Malone (1998). 
24 See www.klimaatmatrix.nl. I represented climate science in this project. The other ‘intendants’ were 
Albert Cath (social sciences), Bram van de Klundert (spatial planning) and Sander de Bruyn 
(economics). Some parts of this address are taken from my Matrix essay (Petersen 2010). 
25 De burger is aan zet na Kopenhagen, De Volkskrant, 22 December 2009, p. 11. 
26 Trouw, 23 February 2010, p. 28. 
27 Trouw, 3 November 2009, p. 28. 
28 See www.klimaatmatrix.nl. 
29 Hajer (2011). 
30 Also acknowledged by Victor (2011). 
31 The discussion of ‘ambiguity’ is based on Byers (2011). 
32 Byers (2011). 
33 Morin (2008). 
34 Gross (2010). 
35 Sen (2009), p. ix. 
36 Morin & Kern (1999). 
37 Latour & Woolgar (1979). 
38 Ryghaug & Skjølsvold (2010). 
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